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INTRODUCTION

Does Title VII's prohibition against hostile environment sexual
harassment conflict with an employer's First Amendment right of free
speech? It does if one accurately applies the Supreme Court's contentneutrality doctrine.
Title VII's anti-harassment regulations are a vital source of
employment law in America. Without them, women and ethnic
minorities would be open to attack in the form of adverse hiring and
firing practices, changes in employment conditions, derogatory social
treatment, and so on. This body of law concerns women in particular
since it is their only protection against gender-motivated harassment
which is too elusive to constitute direct quid pro quo maneuvers.
Women have historically been victims in workplaces poisoned by sex
stereotypes, sexual innuendoes, psychological demoralization based on
gender, and pornographic or nude images, among other adverse
elements. Without Title VII's regulations restricting hostile work
environments, women would be at a tremendous loss of protection
against their employer's actions and, vicariously, against co-workers'
behavior and speech.
Within this context, women may nonetheless find themselves
defenseless and without Title VII's protection unless the Supreme
Court's First Amendment content-neutrality doctrine is amended. Title
VII hostile environment law, by its very nature, is not content-neutral
because it restricts the free speech of employers while not limiting
workplace speech in other respects. It therefore is content-biased in a
way that the Supreme Court's content-neutrality rules do not permit.
Accordingly, hostile environment law is unconstitutional if accurately
applied to the content-neutrality framework.
Can such crucial legislation be saved, despite its clash with the First
Amendment? As it will be argued in this commentary, the hostile
environment scheme can be preserved by applying two of the Supreme
Court's First Amendment exceptions. However, those two exceptions
are arguably invalid, and an alternate theory of constitutionality is
required to save the legislation. On this basis, a new test is proposed and,
ultimately this commentary argues that the Title VII hostile environment
law can survive constitutional scrutiny only upon implementing a new
First Amendment exemption.
Before engaging in this argumentation, it is appropriate to review
the underlying legal principles of First Amendment free speech and
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hostile environment sexual harassment. The following is an introduction
of these principles as they relate to the debate which follows.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The courts first began to question whether sex discrimination law
might conflict with the First Amendment as early as 1973 in Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations.' In that
decision, the Supreme Court made its fledgling attempts to analyze the
potential clash between these conflicting laws, emphasizing the

importance and prevailing status of First Amendment free speech
principles: "freedoms
of speech and of the press rank among our most
2
cherished liberties.",
The courts have since become much more elaborate in analyzing
the clash between sexual harassment and the First Amendment, most
notably since 1992 with the introduction of the R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul
doctrine by the U.S. Supreme Court.3 The R.A. V doctrine, known as
content-neutrality, gave rise to a flood of academic commentaries 4 and,
in some cases, court speculation about the constitutionality of Title VII's
prohibition on hostile environment sexual harassment. 5 Following
R.A. V, there existed a clear and distinct possibility that hostile
environment law would not survive First Amendment scrutiny if
challenged.
In order to shed new light on this question, this commentary will
begin by establishing the relevant legal principles for the law of hostile

1. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
2. Id. at 381.
3. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
4. See generally, J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
2295 (1999); John H. Marks, Title Vi's Flight Beyond First Amendment Radar: A Yin-to-Yang
Attenuation of "Speech" Incident to Discriminatory "Abuse" in the Workplace, 9 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 1 (1999); David L. Dagley, When Does Protected Speech Become Sexual
Discrimination?, 129 EDUC. LAW. REP. 565 (1999); David M. Jaffe, Walking the Constitutional
Tightrope: Balancing Title VII Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims with Free Speech
Defenses, 80 MINN. L. REv. 979 (1996); Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the First
Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 729 (1995); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 461 (1995); Aileen V. Kent, First Amendment Defense to Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment: Does Discriminatory Conduct Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 22
HOFSTRA L. REv. 513 (1994); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A
Primeron Free Speech and Sexual Harassment,68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993).
5. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 409-10 (1992) (White, J., concurring); Saxe v.
State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2001); De Angelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1995).
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environment sexual harassment. It will then proceed to examine the rules
for First Amendment content-neutrality, the exemptions to those rules,
and finally explore the interplay between hostile environment law and
the strict requirements of R.A. V. 's First Amendment doctrine.
A. The Law of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
The legal standard for hostile environment sexual harassment has
been articulated in a range of cases, but it begins with Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.6 Title VII was conceived to prohibit
discrimination; only later was it interpreted to protect against sexual
harassment. The language of Title VII assigns liability to employers who
"fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 7because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.",
The foregoing is Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination
alone, yet was extended to cover hostile environment harassment
through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
1980 guidelines. Those guidelines currently define hostile environment
sexual harassment in the following manner:
§ 1604.11 Sexual harassment.
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title
VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.8
According to the case law and the guidelines, this standard is
administered on the basis of a "totality of the circumstances" test. The
guidelines define this standard in the following terms:
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
7. Id.
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).
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(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at
the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The
determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from
the facts, on a case by case basis.
According to EEOC guidelines, even if the employer has
committed no acts of sexual harassment, the employer can nonetheless
be liable for its employees' harassing behavior.1 ° Specifically, the
guidelines state the following:
(d) With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should
have known of the conduct, unless
11 it can show that it took immediate
and appropriate corrective action.
Thus, an employer can escape vicarious liability for its supervisors'
actions if it took hasty action to correct the behavior as soon as it became
aware of it.
The EEOC guidelines' standard was interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson in 1986.12 In that decision,
the Supreme Court further defined the parameters of sexual harassment
law. Importantly, the court stated that "[f]or sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of employment and create and abusive working
environment."' 13 Thus, since Meritor, in order for a hostile environment
claim to succeed, a plaintiff may show that: (1) the employer's behavior
must have somehow changed the victim's conditions of employment;
and (2) have been abusive.1 4 Evidently, the first criterion is more
difficult for a plaintiff to demonstrate than the second. However, the
standard likely can be met by showing that an employee was subject to
an unnecessary investigation,15 that the employee was being more

9.
10.

29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2004).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,

524 U.S. 742 (1998). These companion cases codified the employer liability standard.
11.
12.
13.
14.

29C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2004).
Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Id. at 67.
Id.

15.

Thompson v. Arkansas Transp. Dep't, 691 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 (E.D. Ark. 1988).
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closely monitored than before or more than other employees, 16 that the
employee's job security was threatened, 7 or that the employee's work
had changed.1 8 These are only a few examples of changes in a victim's
employment conditions.
For purposes of the Meritor test, an employee's conditions of
employment will become changed if the workplace was permeated with
sexually "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 9 The
Meritor test has been interpreted as both a subjective and an objective
one, most notably by Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton.20 These Supreme Court decisions insist that, in order
to establish a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment to be
made out, the plaintiff must have subjectively perceived the employer's
behavior to be hostile and abusive. 2' Any advances or comments made
by the employer must have been unwelcome.2 2 The victim must
genuinely have been offended and injured because of these actions.23
Further, in order for the claim to prevail, the behavior in question
must objectively have been abusive to the reasonable plaintiff.2 4 Thus, a
woman's involvement with her employer arising from a mutual romantic
attraction will not support a claim of sexual harassment. Nor will a
claim arising out of the ordinary challenges of the plaintiffs
workplace.26
Harrisand Faragheradditionally require that a hostile environment
plaintiff must show that she was (1) a member of the protected class (i.e.
female or male, depending on the context); (2) that she faced unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was because of the plaintiff's
sex and not due to other reasons; (4) that the employer either committed
the impugned acts or the employer was vicariously liable for the
27
harassing acts of its employees.
16. See, Seligson v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 677 F. Supp. 648, 656 (D. Mass. 1987) (discussing
personal interrogation and close scrutiny of a plaintiffs travel plans, although the court ultimately
found that the comments did not sufficiently alter the conditions of the plaintiffs employment).
17. Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, 830 F.2d 1554, 1561 (1 lth Cir. 1987).
18. Mitchell v. OsAir, Inc., 629 F.Supp. 636, 643 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
19. Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
20. Harris,510 U.S. at 20-22; Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998).
21. Harris,510 U.S. at 21.
22. Meritor Says. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
23. Reed v.Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 491 (7th Cir. 1991).
24. Harris, 510 U.S. at 20-23; Faragher,524 U.S. at 787-89.
25. Lipsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (D.P.R. 1987).
26. Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing & Heating Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) BB376
1855, 1860 (D. Mass 1987).
27. See Harris,510 U.S. at 20-23; Faragher,524 U.S. at 787-89.
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The test for hostile environment sexual harassment is a sub-test of
the general anti-discrimination standard under Title VII. 28 Hostile
environment sexual harassment law has evolved out of Title VII's
enumeration of "sex" as a prohibited basis of discrimination. However,
hostile environment law can also operate to protect any of the other
prohibited categories of discrimination under Title Vl, including
national origin, race, religion, and color.29 Professor Eugene Volokh has
addressed the scope of Title VII hostile environment law in the
following terms:
[H]arassment law potentially burdens any workplace speech that's
offensive to at least one person in the workplace based on that person's
race, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, veteran status or, in
some jurisdictions, sexual orientation, marital status, political
affiliations, citizenship status, or personal appearance, even when the
speech is political and30 even when it's not severe or pervasive enough
to itself be actionable.
For purposes of the instant commentary, what most importantly
should be gleaned is that hostile environment law arises from Title VII,
namely government legislation protecting particular categories of
persons. Thus, while Title VII prohibits racial or sexual harassment, it
does not, for instance, prevent harassment against homosexuals, union
members, or individuals on the basis of their physical appearance. From
this perspective (and for the First Amendment analysis which follows),
there is a degree of content-selectivity, which benefits some, but injures
others.
Concerning Title VII hostile environment alone, it is a contentselective framework which disfavors speech detrimental to the status of
women, while at the same time favoring speech which advances
women's interests. In short, the content-neutrality of Title VII, or lack
thereof, is significant for an assessment of hostile environment law and
its capacity to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
Bearing in mind the questionable content-neutrality of hostile
environment law, this commentary next addresses the relevant portions

28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
29. Id.
30. Eugene Volokh, What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law
Restrict?, 85 GEo. L. J. 627, 647 (1997).
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of First Amendment case law before examining whether current sexual
harassment law is indeed constitutional.
B. The FirstAmendment Law of Content Neutrality
The notion of content neutrality was first introduced by the 1992
Supreme Court decision, R.A. V v. City of St. Paul.31 In that judgment,
Justice Scalia first introduced the novel concept that legislation
curtailing speech is only constitutional if it does not pick and choose
between the categories of speech content which it bans.32 Otherwise
stated, the prohibition must be a general restriction on an entire class of
speech without singling out sub-categories of expression or favoring
some individuals' speech over others.33
For instance, in the case of R.A. V, the impugned statute was the
City of St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which prohibited
the use of symbols, such as swastikas or graffiti, to express bias on the
basis of "race, color, creed, religion or gender., 34 The Supreme Court
found that the municipal government did not have the right to create
legislation of this sort because it did not constitute a flat ban, but instead
protected against only anti-racial, anti-gender, and anti-religious
symbols, whereas speech motivated by "political affiliation, union
membership, or homosexuality-are not covered [by the statute]," the
court observed.35 Justice Scalia noted that "[t]he point of the First
Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in some
fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content. '3 6 The
Supreme Court therefore found that the St. Paul statute was
unconstitutional because it was, in a sense, silencing speech on the basis

31. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 386-96.
32. Id. at 382-83.
33. Id. at 387.
34. ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). In particular, the statute was phrased as
follows:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,

characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi
Swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Id. The dispute over this ordinance was triggered when a group of youths were criminally accused
of burning a cross during the night upon an African-American family's lawn. R.A. V., 505 U.S. 377.
35. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.

36.

Id. at 392.
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of racial, gender and religious-biased content alone. 37 Otherwise stated,
it was not content-neutral.
Was the city attempting to favor some forms of symbolic speech
while oppressing others on the basis of their content? Upon reading the
statute, it may not have been apparent that this was the case, but the
Supreme Court noted that the ordinance promoted "selectivity of this
sort[,] creat[ing] the possibility that the city is seeking to handicap the
expression of particular ideas.",38 It did not matter that the St. Paul
ordinance targeted "fighting words" speech, a type of expression which
is entirely regulable under the First Amendment. 39 Admittedly,
governments are free to regulate "fighting words" or any speech which
promotes violence-incitement or immediate emotional harm.40 Yet,
Justice Scalia's point in R.A. V was that, despite the government's free
license to regulate "fighting words," "true threats," libel, or obscenities,
it may not regulate such unprotected speech in any manner at all. Rather,
it must do so in a way that respects content-neutrality and creates an
even-handed ban across an entire category. 4' For instance, the St. Paul
city ordinance would have passed constitutional muster if it had broadly
and even-handedly prohibited all fighting-word symbolic speech which
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment" without specifying which type of
content was banned or favored.42
In R.A. V, Justice Scalia provided further examples for his newlycrafted content-neutrality doctrine. He remarked that "the government
may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
43
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government.,
Scalia compared his content-discrimination doctrine to public
restrictions on speech that is intrusive because it is too loud: "[T]he
regulation of 'fighting words,' like the regulation of noisy speech, may

37. Id. at 396.
38. Id.at394.
39. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). "Fighting words" are a form of
speech which is not protected by the First Amendment, and can therefore be regulated and
outrightly prohibited without constitutional consequence. Id. "Fighting words" include any speech
which (1) is likely to cause a violent response; and is (2) likely to cause immediate emotional harm.
Id. at 572. According to Chaplinsky, "fighting words" can be outlawed without offending the First
Amendment because they do not actually express an essential part of an expression of ideas. Id.
Accordingly, the government does not curtail free speech when it curtails the use of "fighting
words." Id. at 573.
40. Id. at 572.
41. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 387-94.
42. Id.at393-94.
43. Id. at 384.
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address some offensive
instances and leave other, equally offensive,
44
instances alone.",

This content-discrimination/content-neutrality doctrine will become
instrumental in the subsequent analysis of Title VII and its sexual
harassment component. In particular, this commentary will ask whether
the content-neutrality doctrine renders Title VII sexual harassment
unconstitutional, since hostile environment law is so keenly focused on
favoring non-harassing content over alternative expression.
In R.A. V., the Supreme Court's concurrence believed that, indeed,
the hostile environment framework had become unconstitutional in the
wake of Scalia's content-neutrality rules.45 Joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and O'Connor, Justice White argued that the majority's newlyfounded doctrine would render Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment a void and unconstitutional body of law, due to its inherently
content-selective nature. 46 In the words of Justice White, "[u]nder the
general rule the Court applies in this case, Title VII hostile environment
claims would suddenly be unconstitutional. 4 7
This question will be resumed after the exceptions to contentneutrality have first been explained in the following portion of this
commentary. Each exception will be related back to Title VII hostile
environment law for the sake of exemplification.
1. Exceptions to the Content-Neutrality Doctrine
At first blush, the content-neutrality doctrine appears damning for
Title VII, since hostile environment sexual harassment law bases its
speech prohibition on gender, rather than a flat ban against all harassing
workplace speech. It will therefore be crucial in the instant analysis to

Id. at 390.
45. Id. at 409 (White, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 409-10.
44.

47. Id. at 409. Justice White elaborated his position as follows:
[Title VII] focuses on what the majority would characterize as the "disfavored topic" of

sexual harassment. In this way, Title VII is similar to the St. Paul ordinance that the
majority condemns because it "imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who
express views on disfavored subjects." Under the broad principle the Court uses to
decide the present case, hostile work environment claims based on sexual harassment

should fail First Amendment review; because a general ban on harassment in the
workplace would cover the problem of sexual harassment, any attempt to proscribe the
subcategory of sexually harassing expression would violate the First Amendment.

Id. (internal marks omitted).
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ascertain what exceptions might apply to save Title VII from
unconstitutionality.
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia articulated three exceptions to the contentneutrality doctrine.48 Each of these exceptions will be explained here and
subsequently applied to hostile environment law to determine Title VII's
sustainability under First Amendment scrutiny.
i. "Secondary Effects" Exemption
The first exemption contemplated in R.A. V is the "secondary
effects" rule. According to this exemption, if a statute which curtails free
speech fails to meet content-neutrality standards, it may nonetheless
survive review for reasons independent of the speech content restriction.
Citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,49 Justice Scalia emphasized
that such "regulation
is 'justifiedwithout reference to the content of the.
50
speech.'

Evidently, this is a highly subjective standard since all it requires is
that a judge perceive the impugned statute as so compelling that its
purpose becomes justifiable, despite the statute's violation of First
Amendment content-neutrality. In this respect, the "secondary effects"
exception resembles the traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny
analysis, absent the narrow-tailoring requirement. 5'
The "secondary effects" doctrine was relied on by the Supreme
Court in Renton to uphold a city ordinance which forced all burlesque
cinemas into one quadrant of the city. 52 Playtime Theatres argued that

the ordinance violated its free speech rights. Yet, the Supreme Court
concluded if the ordinance violated the First Amendment, its "secondary
effects" independently justified its existence. 53 For instance, the city's
property values were boosted because of the legislation and the quality
of life in the city was improved. The totality of these secondary effects
supported maintaining the statute for reasons "without reference to the
content of the ...speech. 4

48.
49.
50.
51.
(1991).
52.

Id. at 388-90.
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986).
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389.
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.

53. Id. at 48.
54. Id.
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On the basis of Renton, the R.A. V court deduced that the contentneutrality doctrine did not apply if a statute was justifiable for reasons
independent of its speech content restrictions.5 5 If any impugned statute
is justifiable in this way, a court could therefore hold a contentdiscriminating statute unconstitutional despite its nonconformity with
the First Amendment. 56
Based on the same reasoning, a court could find that Title VII
similarly has an independent purpose, justifying the statute's
incompatibility with First Amendment content-neutrality. Nonetheless,
Title VII hostile environment principles would surely qualify for the
exemption, given the important secondary effects resulting from
protection against sexual harassment. This reasoning will be resumed in
the analysis under heading III.C.
ii. The "Official-Suppression-Not-Afoot" Exemption
The second exemption articulated in R.A. V is the "officialsuppression-not-afoot" rule.57 Without citing to any existing precedent or
authority, Justice Scalia created this exemption because "it may not even
be necessary to identify any particular 'neutral' basis, so long as the
nature of the content discrimination is such that there is no realistic
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot., 58 In other words, a
statutory content-based speech restriction may be acceptable if the
content-discrimination is inadvertent and there is no objective likelihood
that the drafters intended to favor one category over another.
How does a court gauge whether a government has legislated its
content-discrimination inadvertently, rather than deliberately? Otherwise
stated, how does one determine when no "official suppression of ideas is
afoot." In R.A. V., Justice Scalia provided no guidance in this respect,
introducing this exemption as quickly as he proceeded to the following
one without elaborating on its precise meaning. 59 The Supreme Court
does, however, cite one example of its "official-suppression-not-afoot"
exemption. To illustrate, Justice Scalia stated that there could be no
evidence of deliberate content-discrimination in a statute outlawing
movies with blue-eyed actresses. 6° It is not clear how Justice Scalia
55.

R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 389.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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considered this example to be inadvertent or how a ban on certain films
would suggest that no "official suppression of ideas [was not] afoot,"
given his lack of explanation. 6' One could argue, to the contrary, that the
"official suppression of ideas [was indeed] afoot" in Scalia's example,
since a government may deliberately choose to favor some types of
content over others when restricting blue-eyed films.
Nonetheless, what matters for the instant commentary is that Title
VII would not qualify for this exemption because there is a clear and
deliberate legislative purpose underlying Title VII. The Civil Rights Act
of 1964 purposefully suppresses speech which amounts to
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, national origin and
color.62 Its hostile environment ban purposefully prohibits workplace
speech which is abusive and pervasive enough to alter conditions of
employment.6 3 Conversely, hostile environment law deliberately favors
speech which does not bear these traits. The "official 64suppression of
ideas" is therefore very much part of Title VII's ideology.
iii. The Conduct-Not-Speech Exemption
The third exemption to the content-neutrality doctrine is the
"content-not-speech" exemption. In R.A. V, the Supreme Court implied
that a statute's violation of First Amendment content-neutrality could be
disregarded if it were "swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
directed at conduct rather than speech., 65 As an example of this
exemption, Justice Scalia suggested that legislation criminalizing treason
would pass constitutional muster because federal treason legislation
governs conduct, not speech, and therefore the First Amendment simply
does not apply. 66 Since R.A. V construed legislation as either governing
exclusively speech or exclusively conduct without the potential of the
two overlapping, one must ask whether Justice Scalia would have
applied the "speech-not-conduct" exception to a statute which governs
both conduct and speech simultaneously.
In addition, based on the R.A. V reasoning it is not explained why
content-neutrality, a constitutional doctrine, should not supersede
ordinary state or federal legislation bearing on the same subject matter.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
R.A. V.,505 U.S. at 389.

66. Id.
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Justice Scalia merely stated that "words can in some circumstances
violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law
against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the
nation's defense secrets). 67 It is as if the Supreme Court was implying
that legislation primarily governing conduct is shielded from
unconstitutionality, despite its inherent content-neutrality violation.
For this reason, the "conduct-not-speech" exemption is an unusual
one. However, the Supreme Court may have felt compelled to include it
in the content-neutrality doctrine to avoid Title VII becoming
unconstitutional. The fact that the Court made specific reference to Title
VII may be evidence in support of this speculation. In particular, the
Supreme Court stated the following when elucidating its "conduct-notspeech" exemption:
[S]exually derogatory 'fighting words,' among other words, may
produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices. Where the government does
not target conduct on the basis of its expressive conduct [through Title
VII, which targets solely non-expressive conduct], acts are not shielded
from regulation merely because they express a 68discriminatory idea or
philosophy [protected by the First Amendment].
The weakness of this assertion is that Title VII arguably does
"target conduct on the basis of its expressive conduct" insofar as hostile
environment sexual harassment is concerned. For this reason, one must
ask whether hostile environment sexual harassment presents an
exception to the exception for Title VII.
Some scholars would agree that the "conduct-not-speech"
exception is not legally tenable in the manner described by Justice
Scalia, and that Title VII hostile environment law has great potential to
clash with the First Amendment under content-neutrality principles.
Harvard law professor, Richard Fallon, for instance, has argued that the
"conduct-not-speech" exemption is not legally sound (particularly as a
means of defending Title VII's unconstitutionality) because one cannot
simply disregard the fact that conduct-focused legislation might have a
parallel impact on free speech.69 If a statute curtails protected speech to
any extent at all, a heightened scrutiny analysis is required as a matter of

67. Id.

68. Id. at 389-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment
Dog that Didn'tBark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter "Fallon"].
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constitutional law. 70 As such, the mere "conduct-not-speech" exception
simply will not suffice to save that legislation. Professor Fallon argues
that when all the R.A. V. opinions of both the majority and concurring
justices are viewed as a whole, all nine justices "assumed that the core
Title VIIprohibition againstspeech that creates a discriminatoryhostile
work environment would pass constitutionalmuster. 71
After explaining how R.A. V treats Title VII as satisfying the
"conduct-not-speech" exemption, Professor Fallon then proceeds to
explain why the exemption must fail under First Amendment principles.
Fallon first notes that United States v. O'Brien outrightly rejected a
general ban on all potentially harmful conduct,7 2 although it allowed
such a regulation on speech or expressive conduct where "it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest . . . [is] unrelated to the

suppression of free expression[,] and if the incidental restriction... is no
greater than is essential to that interest." 73 The O'Brien analysis is
therefore at least elevated scrutiny.74 Fallon continues:
There is a deeper problem, however, suggested by O'Brien's
requirement that the government's interest in regulation must be
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression." More or less
obviously, the First Amendment has to limit the legislature's power to
enact "general" statutes that aim at prohibitable [sic] conduct but
[accidentally] sweep in speech that the legislature adjudges harmful
only because of its content. To take an example that Justice Scalia has
used, Congress can prohibit treason, including treason effected through
speech that divulges the nation's defense secrets to an enemy. But
Congress, in enacting a general prohibition against treason, cannot
"incidentally" ban speech that gives aid and comfort to an enemy by
criticizing public officials. It does not matter that the statute is a
general one or that it aims mostly at treasonous conduct. Speech of this
kind is protected by the First Amendment, and heightened scrutiny is
required to ensure that government does not purposefully or off-

70. Id. at 15-16.
71. Id. at 12. Justice Scalia provided in R.A. V. that "words can... sometimes violate laws
directed.., against conduct [and if] the government does not target conduct on the basis of its
expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a
discriminatory idea." R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389. In essence, Scalia concluded that "sexually
discriminatory fighting words, among other words, may produce a violation of Title VIl's general
prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices." Id.
72. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
73. Id. at 377.
74. Fallon, supra note 69, at 15.
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handedly trample on speech rights without substantively adequate
justification.
Other commentators have taken inspiration from the concurring
judges in R.A. V to argue that the "conduct-not-speech" exemption
cannot provide a valid escape from First Amendment content-neutrality
rules. This is because a conduct-based statute which sweeps up speech
incidentally cannot avoid violating Scalia's "secondary effects" rule at
the same time. Commentator Andrea Kirschenbaum notes that despite
the R.A. V. majority attempt to "classify hostile environment sexual
harassment as conduct," the concurrence realized that such a claim must
examine employee impact both subjectively and objectively. Therefore
such regulation is unconstitutional under the secondary effects
exception.7
Finally, other scholars have also urged that the "conduct-notspeech" argument should not prevent defendants (i.e. employers in
hostile environment claims) from invoking their First Amendment
defense. Barbara Lindemann and David Kadue 77 referred to the
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards7 8 decision when making this point.
In Jacksonville Shipyards, a female complainant won her Title VII
hostile environment sexual harassment claim because she was a captive
audience in her workplace, where she was bombarded by female
pornographic photographs. 79 The defendant employer was not
successful, but might have prevailed if it were permitted to invoke a
First Amendment defense. The Middle District of Florida refused to
consider the First Amendment issues at all, stating that "[n]o first
amendment concern arises when the employer has no intention to
express itself,"80 and "to the extent that the regulation here does not
seem entirely content-neutral, the distinction based on the sexually
explicit nature of the pictures and other speech does not offend
constitutional principles." 81

75.

Fallon, supranote 69, at 14-16 (emphasis added).

76. Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Law and the First
Amendment: Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67, 81 (2002) (citations

omitted) [hereinafter Kirshenbaum].
77. BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW (1997) [hereinafter LINDEMANN & KADUE].

78. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
79. Id. at 1535-36.
80. Id. at 1534. Here, the court was referencing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp.
599, 610 & n. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Note that the Jacksonville Shipyards decision preceded the
employer vicarious liability doctrine for harassment, introduced in 1998 through Faragher.
81. Id. at 1535; Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
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Lindemann & Kadue responded to the court's "conduct-notspeech" reasoning by insisting that "categorizing the pictures as
'conduct' obscures the expressive value of the pictures in question...
' 82
the fact remains that displaying pornographic pictures is expression."
The authors elaborated as follows:
The primary rationale ...was [that] the pictures were not in fact

expression but rather "discriminatory conduct." It is not uncommon to
try to finesse difficult First Amendment analysis by characterizing
disagreeable expression as "conduct." But categorizing the pictures as
"conduct" obscures the expressive value of the pictures in question.
Although workplace pornography might resemble conduct in its power
to interfere with a woman's job performance, the fact remains that
displaying pornographic pictures is expression, particularly if it is
intended to offend and demean female co-workers.
In short, many scholars are not convinced that Title VII hostile
environment law governs conduct alone, and not speech. There is a
strong argument that Title VII covers both the alleged conduct and the
expression associated with that conduct, contrary to the Supreme Court's
observations in R.A. V In any event, R.A. V disregarded the hostile
environment84 aspect of Title VII altogether, opening the door to
speculation.

On the other hand, some courts disagree with these commentators
and have come to the defense of R.A. V.'s "conduct-not-speech"
exemption, as well as Jacksonville Shipyards' own interpretation of the
"conduct-not-speech" exception. In Baty v. Willamette Industries, for
85
instance, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took this position.
Nonetheless, it appears that this question is far from settled and that
there may remain a loophole for defendants wishing to invoke the First
Amendment defense to Title VII hostile environment claims, despite the
"conduct-not-speech" doctrine.

82.

LINDEMANN & KADUE supra note 77, at 598.

83.

Id. (citations omitted) (cmphasis added).
R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 389.

84.
85.

Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1999).
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iv. Strict Scrutiny as an Exemption for
Content-Discriminating Statutes
Can strict scrutiny operate as an additional exemption to save
content-discriminating statutes? Logically, one would think that a statute
which serves (1) a compelling state interest and (2) is narrowly tailored
to that interest (i.e. no legislation could possibly impair the defendant's
First Amendment rights any less than the impugned statute) would
satisfy the strict scrutiny test and remain constitutional.86
However, the R.A. V majority did not acknowledge this as one of
the exemptions. According to Justice White's concurrence, the Scalialed majority acted as though strict scrutiny did not exist, and as if it was
not an alternative which could save a content-discriminating statute:
[T]he Court obscures the line between speech that could be regulated
freely on the basis of content (i.e., the narrow categories of expression
falling outside the First Amendment) and that which could be
regulated on the basis of content only upon a showing of a compelling
state interest (i.e., all remaining expression)...
In a second break with precedent, the Court refuses to sustain the
ordinance even though it would survive under the strict scrutiny

applicable to other protected expression. Assuming, arguendo, that the
St. Paul ordinance is a content-based regulation of protected
expression, it nevertheless would pass First Amendment review under
settled law upon a showing that the regulation "is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."..
• Nevertheless, the Court treats strict scrutiny analysis as irrelevant to
the constitutionality of the legislation... Under the majority's view, a
narrowly drawn, content-based ordinance could never pass

constitutional muster if the object of that legislation could be
accomplished by banning a wider category of speech. This appears to
be a general renunciation of strict scrutiny review, a fundamental tool
of First Amendment analysis .... 87

86. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991).
87. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 403-04 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Justice White further noted that the majority's decision was "inexplicable" after the Court's recent
decision in Burson v. Freeman, upholding a decision to apply strict scrutiny to a content-based
statute which regulated polling places. Id. at 404. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 191 (1992).
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As the scholarship has interpreted his words, "Justice White
believed the majority was renouncing strict scrutiny review" 88 for
content-discriminating statutes. It appeared to the concurrence that
satisfying strict scrutiny was not another content-neutrality exemption.
If this is true and the traditional strict scrutiny test cannot save
content-discriminating legislation, it does not matter that a contentbiased statute like Title VII is supported by a compelling state interest or
might be narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. If this is
what the R.A. V. majority has articulated as its standard, the
concurrence's disagreement does not turn strict scrutiny into an
additional exception to the content-neutrality rule. As such, it remains a
non-exception, one which cannot save Title VII.
One commentator has observed that even if a content-neutral statute
could be saved through the strict scrutiny test, Title VII hostile
environment law would not pass because it lacks narrow tailoring. In
other words, the current hostile environment standard could have been
more narrowly defined to suppress free speech to a lesser degree. The
following was argued by Jessica Kamer:
Under Title VII hostile environment law ...liability for speech is

based on a reasonable recipient's reaction to the speech. Texas v.
Johnson held that laws that define the legality of speech within
reference to the impact on the hearer constitute content regulation...
•Although the eradication of sexual discrimination in the workplace
may be a compelling state interest, strict scrutiny is an exceedingly

difficult test to meet. The "necessary" and "narrowly tailored"
requirements mandate that there be no less speech-restrictive means to
achieve the compelling state interest. There is almost always a less
speech-restrictivemeansfor achieving any state interest ....Finally, a

more narrowly defined standard of hostile environment liability89 could
suppress less speech while still advancing the goals of Title VII.
However, another commentator has argued that a contentdiscriminating statute should indeed survive the First Amendment if it
satisfies strict scrutiny, contrary to what the R.A. V.court implied. That
scholar, Andrea Kirshenbaum, argued that Title VII hostile environment
law was, in her view, narrowly tailored and therefore should survive
First Amendment review on a strict scrutiny basis, despite its concededly

88. Kirshenbaum,supra note 76, at 80-81.
89. Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment, and a Captive Workforce, 83
CAL. L. REv. 637, 653-54 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Kamer].
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lacking content-neutrality. This is in sharp contrast to Karner's opinion
cited above. Kirshenbaum articulated her argument as follows:
Although the Third Circuit's decision in Saxe90 suggests that the First
Amendment could pose tremendous obstacles to the continuing vitality
of the hostile environment harassment doctrine, its opinion provides
two possible methods of avoiding a collision of the two areas. First,
Judge Alito conceded that the prevention of discrimination in schools
and the workplace is a compelling government interest. Therefore one
could argue, as several courts and commentators have, that even if
Title VII and Title IX place content-based restrictions on speech, both
statutes satisfy the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standard because
91
they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.

Aileen Kent is another commentator supporting Kirschenbaum's
contention that hostile environment sexual harassment law can survive
strict scrutiny.9 2 Kirschenbaum describes Kent's research and logic as
follows:
In order to determine whether Title VII serves a compelling
government interest, Kent looked to the policy underlying the statute
and argued that the eradication of discrimination in the workplace is a
compelling interest. Kent viewed the prohibition against hostile
environment harassment in the workplace as one way of ensuring
equal employment opportunity. She also viewed Title VII's prohibition
against hostile environment sexual harassment as a compelling

90. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
91. Kirshenbaum, supra note 76, at 87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See Baty v.
Willamette Indus. Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-1247 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding the district court's
judgement against defendant employer for hostile environment sexual harassment did not violate the
First Amendment). The district court had argued:
If the speech at issue is treated as fully protected, the government's compelling interest
in eradicating discrimination in the workplace permits such regulation; other First
Amendment rights, such as the Freedom of Association, have bowed to narrowly tailored
remedies designed to advance the government's compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination in the workplace.
Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., No. 96-2181-JWL, 1997 WL 292123, at *7.See also Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1536 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (reinforcing that Title VII's
prohibition of hostile environment sexual harassment law satisfies strict scrutiny). Let us note,
however, that Jacksonville Shipyards predates R.A. V by one year and was not decided on the basis
of the content-neutrality rules which R.A. V introduced to First Amendment law.
92. Aileen V. Kent, First Amendment Defense to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment:
Does Discriminatory Conduct Deserve Constitutional Protection?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 513, 514
(1994) (claiming that Title VII is narrowly tailored for the compelling governmental interest of
eradicting work discrimination, thereby passing strict scrutiny analysis).
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government interest because of the "devastating psychological,
emotional, physical and economic effects on the victim who has been
sexually harassed which has the result of stripping that victim of the
equal employment opportunities she is guaranteed by Title VII." Kent
then looked to the language of Title VII and argued that it is narrowly
tailored to serve the compelling government interest of providing equal
employment opportunities. She contended that "the people who are
in which it is
regulated, the conduct which is prohibited, and the places 93
prohibited, are clearly and narrowly defined by Title VII."
In short, while R.A. V suggests that satisfying strict scrutiny is not
an additional content-neutrality exemption, the preceding scholarship
takes the contrary view. For purposes of the instant commentary
however, let us assume that what R.A. V implies must take precedence
over any scholarship.
v. The "Special Virulence" Exception
The final exemption is the "special virulence" exception. After
defining the "special virulence" exception to content-neutrality, this
commentary will proceed to explain how "special virulence" has
evolved in recent Supreme Court case law, and how these changes
impact Title VII hostile environment law.
Like all other exceptions to content-neutrality, "special virulence"
was articulated in the R.A. V majority opinion by Justice Scalia. 94
According to R.A. V, if a statute proscribes a specially virulent speech
act, it will be permitted to deviate from Scalia's content-neutrality
requirements. In other words, it is not required to maintain an evenhanded treatment of all categories of persons or things it protects. 95 What
this means is that a statute may outlaw the most potent form of a
particular type of speech, without being limited to a content-neutral,
even-handed ban across the entire category of speech. 96 Thus, "special
virulence," in this sense refers to the degree of offensiveness which a
category within a category of speech represents. A government is not
free to proscribe speech against the particular subcategories of content
which it discourages (thereby revealing the government's bias), but may
instead proscribe the most heinous, shocking, potent, or offensive

93. Kirschenbaum, supra note 76, at 88; Kent, supra note 92, at 514.
94. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
95. Id. at 387.
96. Idat 388.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2006

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 3
394

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 23:373

subcategory of speech within the broader class. 97 Thus, "special
virulence" is the exception which permits content-discrimination to the
extent that the proscribed speech is "specially virulent," viz. the most
virulent possible within its category. 98
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia described this content-neutrality exemption
in the following manner:
When the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no
significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination exists. Such a
reason, having been adjudged neutral enough to support exclusion of
the entire class of speech from First Amendment protection, is also
neutral enough to form the basis of distinction within the class. To
illustrate: A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is
the most patently offensive in its prurience-i.e., that which involves
the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit,
for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages.

99

Simply stated, by singling out the most obscene form of obscenity,
a statute does not pick favorites among content, because it focuses on the
most extreme elements from the entire speech category. By selecting
only the extremities of a particular speech form, a government selects on
the basis of degree, not content.
The meaning of the "special virulence" exception is not entirely
clear from Justice Scalia's own description, but is comprehensible from
the examples which he provides. In any event, subsequent courts and
scholars have attributed Scalia's intended meaning to the "special
virulence" exception: "[T]he first R.A. V exception allows a city or state
to regulate certain fighting words precisely because they represent a
most inciteful and 'especially offensive mode of expression.' ,,100
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia provided the additional example
concerning threats against the President. 101 It does not matter that violent
threats are not a protected form of expression under the First
Amendment. For even a statute which regulates unprotected speech
cannot prohibit expression in a content-discriminating manner.

97.

Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Jonathan M. Holdowsky, Out of the Cross: The Legacy of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 30
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1115, 1160 (1996).
101. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
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Accordingly, a statute which prohibits only threats based on the
President's foreign policy or the President's inner city policy would be
unlawful content discrimination. 102 However, a government could safely
ban all threats against the President without violating content-neutrality,
since any presidential threat is the most virulent of its kind; furthermore,
special force when applied to the person of the
threats "have
10 3
President."'
vi. The Newly-Modified "Special Virulence" Exception
from Virginia v. Black
Although it is not altogether clear, it appears that R.A. V.'s version
of the "special virulence" exemption has been interpreted differently
post-1992 by lower court case law,' °4 and that this alternate
interpretation of "special virulence" became official in 2003 with the
Supreme Court's Virginia v. Black. 105 Without engaging in a complex
discussion on the transition undergone by "special virulence" since
1992, simply stated, this exemption has become one which now rescues
any "particularly virulent form' 10 6 (Black) of proscribed speech from
unconstitutionality, rather than solely the "most patently offensive"
form' 7 (R.A. V). This may not have been how Justice Scalia intended it
to be interpreted, but under Black this appears to be the Supreme Court's
final version of "special virulence."

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. For instance, the following cases may have been predecessors of the Virginia v. Black
interpretation of 'special virulence' and contributed to the Supreme Court's most recent version of
the exemption: In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Washington v.
Talley, 858 P.2d 217, 225-26 (Wash. 1993).
105. Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536 (2003). In Black, the U.S. Supreme Court debated the
constitutionality of a Virginia statute banning public cross-burnings. Id. The statute under review
was held to be unconstitutional for overbreadth, but was otherwise constitutional because it
qualified for the 'special virulence' exemption, despite the statute's content discrimination (viz. the
statute exhibited favoritism by outlawing cross-burning without assigning an equal prohibition to
other threatening forms of speech). Id. at 1550. The Virginia statute read as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person
or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a
highway or other public place . . . Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie
evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.
Id. at 1541-42 (citing Virginia Code § 18.2-423). The defendants, who were burning a cross
publicly at a Ku Klux Klan rally, unsuccessfully argued that the statute was unconstitutional under
R.A. V.'s content-neutrality principles. Id. at 1549-50.
106. Id. at 1549. This was the terminology used by Justice O'Connor in Black.
107. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388. This was the terminology used by Justice Scalia in RA.V.
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Thus, since Black, almost all proscribed speech could
hypothetically qualify for the "special virulence" exception, rendering
content-neutrality an utterly useless doctrine. In his Black dissent,
Justice Souter remarked that R.A. V's originally-conceived "special
virulence" exemption was limited to only the "most obviously
proscribable instances"' 08 of speech. This is in contrast to Black's
version which now allows any "particularly virulent"' 0 9 proscribed
speech to qualify. Justice Souter remarked, "I do not think that the
Virginia statute qualifies for this virulence exception as R.A. V.explained
it .... [T]he majority's discussion of a special virulence exception here
moves that exception toward a more flexible conception than the version
in R.A. V."'' °
In the commentary which follows, it will be argued that Title VII
hostile environment law should be saved from unconstitutionality
because of the most recent formulation of "special virulence," in
addition to the "secondary effects" exemption. The "strict scrutiny"
exemption, however, will be ruled out, and it will be argued that the
Supreme Court must clarify the doctrine.

III. TITLE VII HARASSMENT &
THE CONTENT-NEUTRALITY EXEMPTIONS

The foregoing application of the exemptions to hostile environment
law illustrates that there are ways Title VII sexual harassment law could
be exempt from the strict prohibitions of R.A. V.'s content-neutrality
doctrine. However, this is not altogether clear in the case law or
scholarly commentary and, even if it were possible, the cases do not
clearly identify the appropriate R.A. V exemption for Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment. After reviewing the exemptions and
their potential to excuse the content discrimination inherent in Title VII,
Professor Kingsley Browne concluded that "none of the existing First
Amendment doctrines, relied upon by commentators, can justify the
broad regulation of workplace speech [under Title VII hostile
environment law].""'...
What is of particular interest is not whether Title VII hostile
environment
law
would
survive
R.A. V's
content-neutrality
108. Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1560 (Souter, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1549 (Souter, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
11I.Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title V's Regulation of
Employee Speech, 27 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 563, 568 (2001) [hereinafter Browne].
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requirements, but whether the renewed "special virulence" exception in
Black could save Title VII sexual harassment law, even though hostile
environment law might have been unconstitutional in 1992 following
R.A. V It is also of interest whether hostile environment law should have
been accounted for under the "secondary effects" exemption because, as
argued in the following, it cannot properly be accounted for under the
"conduct-not-speech" exemption, even though R.A. V may have
purported otherwise. The "strict scrutiny" exemption also deserves some
additional attention in the following portion of this commentary.
Furthermore, it will be argued here that the Supreme Court must
articulate new content-neutrality exemptions to accommodate Title VII
hostile environment law, since its brief references to Title VII in
R.A. V. 2 and Mitchell' 3 have amounted to inadequate guidance.
Alternatively, the Supreme Court must clearly state which of the existing
exemptions should excuse hostile environment law from contentneutrality requirements; the Supreme Court has never addressed this
issue before and, as a result of lacking judicial guidance, considerable
114
speculation has developed in the lower courts and remains unresolved.
Without further specification from the Supreme Court, hostile
environment sexual harassment may become an unconstitutional body of
law. All of these issues are addressed in the following portion of this
commentary.
A. Does Title VII Hostile Environment Law Violate
Content-NeutralityPrinciples?
Before scrutinizing each question closely, let us begin first to
consider whether Title VII hostile environment law actually violates the
content-neutrality rules. Evidently, the five exemptions serve no purpose
if Title VII's ban on sexually harassing speech can survive contentneutrality regardless.
Some courts and scholars have conceded outright that Title VII's
hostile environment prohibition violates content-discrimination
principles. As introduced under heading II.B, in R.A. V., Justice White's
four-judge concurrence insisted that Scalia's new content-neutrality
framework risked rendering Title VII hostile environment claims

112. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
113. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
114. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2001); De Angelis v. El
Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
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unconstitutional. This was because of the content-selectivity of its
particularized speech ban. White's concurrence stated, "[u]nder the
general rule the Court applies in this case, Title VII hostile environment
claims would suddenly be unconstitutional."'' Justice White further
stated that:
[H]ostile environment sexual harassment] focuses on what the majority
would characterize as the "disfavored topic" of sexual harassment. In
this way, Title VII is similar to the St. Paul ordinance that the majority
condemns because it "imposes special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects." Under the broad principle
the Court uses to decide the present case, hostile work environment
claims based on sexual harassment should fail First Amendment
review; because a general ban on harassment in the workplace would
cover the problem of sexual harassment, any attempt to proscribe the
subcategory of
sexually harassing expression would violate the First
116
Amendment.

Some courts have shared this view, including the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers,
the Fifth Circuit noted that Title VII's rules banning hostile environment
sexual harassment constitute a content-discriminating scheme contrary
to R.A. V 11 7 Referring to the "conduct-not-speech" exemption," 8 the
court said that this is because Title VII hostile environment law is not
directed at conduct, but rather at speech when it focuses on verbal
insults, pictorial or literary matter.' 19 Justice Edith Jones, writing for the
Fifth Circuit, commented as follows:
Where pure expression is involved, Title VII steers into the territory of
the First Amendment. It is no use to deny or minimize this problem
because, when Title VII is applied to sexual harassment claims
founded solely on verbal insults, pictorial or literary matter, the statute
imposes content-based, viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on
speech. 120

Similarly, questioning the constitutionality of hostile environment
anti-harassment policies in schools rather than employment, the Third
115. R.A. V.,
505 U.S. at 409 (White, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 409-10 (citations omitted).
117. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 597.
118. Id. at n.7.
119. Id. at 597.
120. Id. at 596-97 (citations omitted).
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Circuit Court of Appeals has defined these policies as "content-based,
viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions on speech." ' 121 In Saxe v. State
College Area Schools District,the Third Circuit acknowledged R.A. V's
recognition that Title VII should generally be exempt from contentneutrality, but remained skeptical, stating that Justice Scalia's ruling did
not necessarily mean that anti-discrimination laws are categorically
immune from First Amendment challenge when they are applied to
prohibit speech solely on the basis of its expressive content . . .
"Harassing" or discriminatory speech, although evil and offensive,
emotions that nevertheless
may be used to communicate ideas or
122
implicate First Amendment protections.

Arguably, Title VII is targeted solely at expressive content only
insofar as its hostile environment sexual harassment prohibitions are
concerned. Heading II.A explained that hostile environment sexual
harassment proscribes speech acts and pictorial or literary matter that
create an overall abusive environment sufficient to alter the victim's
terms of employment. 123 Accordingly, hostile environment harassment
generally emanates from forms of speech.
Scholars agree with these courts that Title VII hostile environment
law is content-discriminating in violation of the R.A. V rules. Some
commentators have argued that "[h]ostile environment sexual
124
harassment law allows punishment for speech based on content."'
Others, including Paul Weizer, have argued that "any restriction that
prefers one position over another will always fail First Amendment
review .... While workplace speech may receive less protection than

that are placed may be
would speech in a public forum, any restrictions
125
basis."
content-neutral
a
on
done only
Thus, although the R.A. V majority hastily dismissed the possibility
that Title VII violates content-neutrality principles, 126 the Supreme Court
remained silent about the hostile environment aspect of Title VII. Was
Justice Scalia silent in this regard because he would have had difficulty
121. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 206.
122. Id. at 209.
123. Mentor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
124. Karner, supra cote 89, at 653.
125. PAUL 1. WEIZER, THE SUPREME COURT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
HARASSMENT WHILE PRESERVING FREE SPEECH 81-82 (2000) [hereinafter WEIZER].

PREVENTING

126. R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 389. This misguided perception was even reinforced by the Supreme
Court when, in 1993, it stated that "in RA. v. St. Paul, we cited Title VII as an example of a
permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct." Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487
(1993).
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explaining how Title VII hostile environment law survived his new
content-neutrality doctrine? This question will be left as a matter of
speculation here. Yet, as all the foregoing arguments illustrate, there is a
strong case to be made that the hostile environment prohibition under
Title VII is a content-discriminating curtailment of speech.
Having established this point, the instant commentary now turns to
the exemptions which hostile environment law can realistically invoke to
escape content-neutrality. In this part, we will identify how R.A. V erred
in emphasizing "content-not-speech" as the only exemption suitable for
Title VII.
B. The Content-NeutralityExemptions:
Which Exemptions CannotSave Hostile EnvironmentLaw
from Unconstitutionality?
This commentary has already explained why some of the contentneutrality exemptions are not appropriate to save hostile environment
sexual harassment from unconstitutionality. For instance, the "strict
scrutiny" exemption has been ruled out because R.A.V abandoned it,
implicitly discounting its ability to save content-selective laws from a
First Amendment violation. 127 This issue was debated under heading
II.B. 1.iv.
The "official-suppression-not-afoot" exemption must also be ruled
out because Title VII's hostile environment component was clearly
conceived with the legislative intent of suppressing gender-biased
speech. It does not matter that the speech which Title VII prohibits is not
worthy of First Amendment protection. It is sufficient that the Title VII
speech ban was deliberately devised to favor speech not creating an
abusive workplace environment over that which does. 128 This reasoning
was presented in greater detail under heading II.B. 1.ii.
Finally, the "conduct-not-speech" exemption is also not suited to
the hostile environment ban, even though R.A. V stated that it was this
very exemption which could save Title VII from content-discrimination
and, by extension, unconstitutionality. Yet, the Supreme Court's reliance
on this exemption depended on Title VII being a solely, or at least
primarily, conduct-governing legislative scheme. In the framework of
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and mixed motive discrimination
claims, this may be true: hiring, firing, and promotion decisions are often
127.
128.

R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 403-05 (White, J., concurring).
Id.at 390.
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portrayed by the courts as acts of conduct, not speech, whereas the
speech elements of a claim may only substantiate the conduct itself.
However, this aspect of Title VII's scope should be juxtaposed
against, rather than harmonized, with Title VII hostile environment
claims, since the latter entail primarily speech acts. Hostile environment
29
litigation typically involves, for example, sexually suggestive jokes, 130
references to women using verbal slurs such as "bitch" and "fat ass,'
displaying photographs of sparsely-clad or pornographic women,'13
inappropriate references to the human anatomy, 32 the employer's133
commeits about a lacking sexual relationship with his wife,
invitations to go on dates, 134 comments or compliments about the
plaintiffs body, 35 and so on. All of the foregoing activities relate to
speech primarily, and to conduct only secondarily. The R.A. V rationale
that Title VII regulates conduct, not speech, must therefore fail as
regards hostile environment law. This is despite the fact that the law
defines hostile environment harassment as impugning both "verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature."'' 36 Physical conduct, concededly,
can support a hostile environment claim, and has done so in cases of
38
physical touching, 137 giving the plaintiff materials of a sexual nature,
looking down the plaintiffs shirt, 39 inviting female strippers to social
functions of the workplace, 40 taking photographs of the plaintiffs
body, 14 ' and so on. However, as the fact patterns of most cases attest,
hostile environment sexual harassment law targets primarily speech acts.
In any event, many of the acts discussed here bridge the common space
of both speech and conduct. Accordingly, hostile environment sexual
harassment likely should not qualify for the "conduct-not-speech"
exemption to content-neutrality. A more detailed discussion of these
arguments is presented under heading II.B. 1.iii.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Reed, 939 F.2d at 491.
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 1986).
Id. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1535-36 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir. 1987).

Id.
Tomka v. SeilerCorp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995).
Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1988).

Id.
Id.
Trotta v. Mobile Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

Id.
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C. Exemptions Which Save Hostile Environment Law
By contrast with the three foregoing exemptions, there are two
others for which the Title VII hostile environment prohibition may
indeed qualify, namely the "secondary effects" exemption and the
"special virulence" exemption. However, their legitimacy is
questionable since, under both exemptions, almost any statute could pass
constitutional muster.
1. "Secondary Effects"
As explained under heading II.B.l.ii, the "secondary effects"
exemption
saves
content-selective
statutory
regimes
from
unconstitutionality by considering their ultimate purpose or secondary
effects. If the statute produces secondary effects that a court finds
beneficial to society, this benefit may outweigh the detriment of the
statute's content-discrimination. Otherwise stated, if the curtailed speech
had detrimental effects economically, socially, politically, and so on, an
unconstitutionally content-selective ban on that speech would be
exempted. This is because the speech restriction would be independently
1 42
justified "without reference to the content of the ... speech. 1
Applying the theory underlying this exemption to hostile
environment law, one can identify adverse "secondary effects" which
would result from not restricting work environments poisoned with
sexual harassment and abusive management. If hostile environment
restrictions were rendered unconstitutional, the secondary effects would
be that employers could (1) change conditions of employment in a
gender-motivated way; and (2) create an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment for women, in particular.1 43 The
secondary effects of lifting the speech ban are so detrimental that they
would justify a court disregarding the content-neutrality doctrine and
finding the exemption applicable. Thus, arguably, this exemption is
adapted to the hostile environment framework and would save Title VII
sexual harassment from unconstitutionality.'a

142. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389.
143. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a) (1988).
144. In opposition to this view, some scholars have argued that the "secondary effects"
exemption should not, and could not, save Title VII hostile environment law from
unconstitutionality, given the content-neutrality doctrine. Wayne State professor Kingsley Browne
has taken this position, arguing that the adverse "secondary effects" referred to in RA. V and,
originally, Renton must not include listeners' reactions:
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However, one must question whether there is really any legislation
which would not support the "secondary effects" exemption? Virtually
all statutes which have survived legislative debates have a soundly
motivated purpose. Thus, the removal of almost any statute would entail
adverse secondary effects and therefore justify preserving the statute in
its content-discriminating form. Based on this analysis, the application
of the "secondary effects" exemption should be so widespread that it
will eventually swallow itself. In time, the exception will become the
rule and content-neutrality will, conceivably, serve no purpose at all.
In sum, although there is a strong argument that hostile
environment sexual harassment law could be saved by the "secondary
effects" exemption, and further, that R.A. V should have noted this
potentiality, acknowledging this fact is of no benefit to hostile
environment law if the "secondary effects" exemption itself is of no
merit. A First Amendment exemption is without merit if it applies
universally, and therefore, is not an exemption in the first place.
Since 1992 when the R.A. V content-neutrality doctrine came into
being, no court has dared to point out this weakness in Justice Scalia's
logic. Nonetheless, it is a point worth making if preserving Title VII's
constitutionality is the object of our analysis.
2. "Special Virulence"
Finally, as an alternative to the dubious "secondary effects" rule,
the "special virulence" exemption is the only remaining R.A. V-endorsed
outlet to save hostile environment law. Recalling headings II.B. 1.v and
II.B. 1.vi, "special virulence" was one of Justice Scalia's ways to exempt
content-discriminating legislation from First Amendment review.145
Some have argued that harassing speech disadvantages women and minorities by
lowering their self-esteem, interfering with their ability to perform their jobs, and
generally demoralizing them. Because the concrete harm to employment opportunities is
a "secondary effect" of the speech that is being regulated, the argument goes, harassment
regulation is a permissible restriction on speech under Renton [see supra note 51]. The
flaw in this argument is that the Supreme Court has held that "listeners' reactions to
speech" are not the kind of "secondary effects" discussed in Renton. [Citing to Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-36 (1988).] It is precisely the listeners' reactions that are of
concern in harassment cases - either women's reactions to hostile speech that impairs
their ability to function in the workplace or co-workers' reactions to the speech that may
lead them to view women as primarily sexual creatures rather than co-workers of equal
status.
Browne, supra note 111, at 567-68. As true as this may be, since the Supreme Court disregards this
consideration in R.A. V., we are entitled to do so as well.
145. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
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However, as argued in II.B. 1.vi, following Black the "special virulence"
by the Supreme
exemption appeared to have been broadened in scope
146
Court, relative to its originally intended meaning.
For the sake of review, one should note that the "special virulence"
was originally described as protecting only the "most patently offensive"
category. 147
sub-class of speech within its broader speech
Hypothetically, if a statute were designed to express content-favoritism
by banning, for instance, "fighting word" speech critical of apples, but
did not curtail similar speech against oranges, grapes and pineapples,
then within the fruit category this statute would tacitly be promoting
speech against oranges, pineapples and grapes. 48 Accordingly, the
statute would violate the First Amendment's content-neutrality
principles. However, this fruit "fighting words" statute could be saved
from unconstitutionality if it outlawed apple speech because speech
critical of apples was the most potent and virulent form of anti-fruit
speech in existence. 149 This is according to the articulation of the
"special virulence" exemption provided by Justice Scalia in R.A.V. 5 0
By contrast, Black later appeared to say that "special virulence"
allowed legislators to single out and prohibit any "particularly virulent"
sub-category within a speech class. 51 This could include, for instance,
banning speech critical of apples, oranges, pineapples and tangerines,
but not grapes. Under Black's interpretation, this would be acceptable
legislation under the "special virulence" exemption because any virulent
speech form would qualify for the prohibition. 152 Thus, if all fruit
"fighting words," except speech concerning grapes, were "particularly
their class, the statute would withstand
virulent" expression within
53
constitutional scrutiny.'
The danger of Black's broader interpretation of "special virulence"
is that arguably any statute could pass constitutional muster by relying
on it. It would allow any legislature to fight First Amendment contentneutrality simply by arguing that its statute, no matter how broad or
discriminating, curtails only virulent speech. The original R.A.V rule

146.
147.
Court.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Black, 123 S.Ct. at 1559 (Souter, J., dissenting).
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. This was the term used by Justice Scalia for the majority of the
See id.
See id.
Id.
Black, 123 S.Ct. at 363.
Seeidat361.
See id.
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that speech restrictions qualifying for "special virulence" can only reach
the most virulent form of speech within the class appears to have been
abandoned.
As this relates to hostile environment law, there is no doubt that
sexually harassing expression is a virulent form of speech. In Faragher
v. City of Boca Raton, the Supreme Court characterized hostile
environment as creating "a sexually objectionable environment ...both
objectively and subjectively offensive . . . [with regard to] its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, . . . and whether it

unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."' 5 4 This
characterization demonstrates the virulence projected by gendermotivated workplace speech.
Bearing this in mind, one must nonetheless examine whether
gender-biased harassment is the most virulent form of harassing speech,
or is simply one virulent type of harassing speech among others. Title
VII's hostile environment harassment prohibition does not, for instance,
protect homosexuals from anti-gay bias and harassment. Does this mean
that gay-biased harassment is a less virulent form of expression than
hostile environment sexual harassment? In order for hostile environment
sexual harassment to survive R.A. V's original "special virulence"
exemption, sexual harassment would have to be the most virulent form
of speech within its class. 55 Accordingly, gay-bashing harassment must
entail a lesser degree of virulence in order for Title VII hostile
environment sexual harassment to survive the technical definition
156
enunciated by Justice Scalia.
On the other hand, so long as hostile environment sexual
harassment constitutes any particularly virulent form of speech from
among the others in its class (the others being virulent or non-virulent
had no importance to the Black court), it would survive the First
Amendment under Justice O'Connor's construction of "special
157

virulence."

Simply stated, the unspoken reality of Title VII's hostile
environment sexual harassment is that it would not survive under the
1992 R.A. V.construction of the "special virulence" exemption, but it
could arguably withstand First Amendment content-neutrality review
under the 2003 Black standard. This inconsistency, while appearing

154.
155.
156.
157.

Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998).
R.A. V, 505 U.S. at 388.
See id.
See Black, 123 S.Ct.at 1549-50.
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arbitrary, may be a saving grace for the constitutionality of hostile
environment law. Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court has never
taken a position on the appropriate analysis for hostile environment
sexual harassment, this question remains under a shroud of mystery to
scholars and courts alike.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW TYPE OF
CONTENT-NEUTRALITY ANALYSIS

The foregoing exposes the potential of the content-neutrality
exemptions to produce arbitrary judgments, even though the doctrine
was articulated to have the outward appearance of principled rules.
Concededly, this effect has been reinforced by Black, which increased
the potential margin for judicial arbitrariness. Although only two of the
exemptions can (arguably) save hostile environment law, four of them
bear tremendous potential for arbitrary application, namely the
exemptions referred to as "official-suppression-not-afoot," "conduct-notspeech," "secondary effects," and "special virulence." It is not
impossible that the content-neutrality exemptions were designed
deliberately for this type of flexibility, such that the outcome could be
governed by judicial "gut-feeling" rather than the restraint of firm,
inflexible rules. However, that speculation shall be left for future
commentary.
What is of concern here is that the Supreme Court must clarify (1)
whether Title VII's prohibition of hostile environment sexual harassment
can survive First Amendment content-neutrality; and if so, (2) how it
should be exempt from content-neutrality. Should there be an additional
exemption for hostile environment law which has not yet been
introduced? At the present time, the Supreme Court has made no
pronouncements on these questions, leaving the lower courts to
speculate. As discussed, the Supreme Court has only made a general
observation that Title VII discrimination constituted conduct, not speech,
and could therefore evade content-neutrality requirements through the
"conduct-not-speech" exemption.1 58 This does not resolve how the
courts should approach hostile environment sexual harassment, the latter
being a far different concept from disparate treatment discrimination.
With the law remaining hazy at best, employers and employees
both need to know whether Title VII hostile environment speech
restrictions violate the First Amendment. As a matter of the due process
158. R.A.V, 505 U.S. at 389.
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notice requirement, employers have the right to know whether a First
Amendment defense is available to them in hostile environment
litigation. At the same time, employee plaintiffs have the right to know
what arguments they can submit in response to an employer's First
Amendment allegations. All of this remains speculative concerning
hostile environment sexual harassment, in the absence of any
enlightenment from the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the "secondary effects" exemption should be defined
with greater clarity so that not just any positive consequence of a statute
will allow it to escape content-neutrality. If the Supreme Court wishes to
maintain this test, it could be more forthcoming by calling "secondary
effects" a "balancing test." Yet, the superior and more principled
approach would be to abolish the "secondary effects" exemption
altogether and instead apply a strict scrutiny analysis. As argued in the
foregoing, "secondary effects" is merely an incomplete version of the
strict scrutiny analysis.
In addition, clarification is needed from the Supreme Court on the
question of whether the Black standard or the slightly more restrictive
R.A. V. version of "special virulence" is currently in force. The Black
court did not deliberately modify the R.A. V "special virulence"
exemption, and Justice O'Connor may not have realized she was doing
so. As such, it remains unclear whether the lower courts must follow the
earlier R.A. V. articulation of the rule, or can instead apply the more
lenient Black standard which has apparently emerged since. The
Supreme Court can put an end to the speculation by making its
intentions clear.
For all of these reasons, a clearer test is needed, particularly one
which will account for Title VII's speech-reaching implications, and not
just the conduct it restricts. Taking all of the current flaws into account,
a new model is proposed here which is intended to govern all contentneutrality analysis, and not simply the hostile environment sexual
harassment legislation.
Simply stated, the Supreme Court should abandon the exemptions it
articulated in R.A. V and instead rescue content-discriminating statutes
through either the traditional strict scrutiny analysis159 or the new
balancing test proposed here. The balancing test would consolidate
certain elements of the existing exemptions and take into account the
harm which would result if a statute were declared unconstitutional
159. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text for an explanation of the traditional strict
scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment.
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(rather than the consequences of banning an impugned subclass of
speech, as the "secondary effects" exemption does). It would weigh the
importance of maintaining statutory content-neutrality and the value of
the speech restricted by the statute 160 against the importance of the
legislation and its survival. It should also consider the degree of harm
caused by the challenged statute and how it injures speech.
Evidently, the ideal balancing test would favor the survival of
speech protected by the First Amendment by assigning less weight to
constitutionally unprotected expression including fighting words, true
threats, and obscenity. Thus, a content-discriminating statute which
restrains the latter would have a greater chance of passing constitutional
scrutiny under this balancing theory. This is because the purpose of
content-neutrality should be to avoid any detriment to those who enjoy a
protected speech right, but have lost this right due to disparate speech
privileges which have been legislated (in complete disregard of the
content-neutrality doctrine). The purpose of content-neutrality should
not be to treat unprotected speech like protected speech at the expense of
rendering statutes (and their compelling legislative interests)
unconstitutional.
Applying this to the realm of Title VII hostile environment
restrictions, much sexually derogatory and harassing workplace speech
amounts to nothing more than either "fighting words" (e.g. words which
incite anger and hostility in the hearer, such as sexually-motivated
insults) or "obscenities" (e.g. pornographic posters or explicit magazines
in the workplace). As explained earlier, both of these categories
constitute unprotected forms of expression under the First Amendment
and would therefore weigh less heavily into the balancing test proposed
here. Sexually harassing speech which fell into these two categories
could conceivably survive our content-neutrality balancing test;
160. Thus, fighting words, true threats, obscenity, and other unprotected speech would rarely
outweigh the adverse consequence of declaring the statutory speech ban unconstitutional. This is a
flaw which was not taken into account by R.A. V The R.A. V. court failed to observe that
constitutionally unprotected speech is nothing more than just unprotected speech. Contentdiscriminating statutes which target it should therefore not be of concern from a First Amendment
standpoint. In this regard, Justice White criticized the majority opinion in R.A. V.:
Should the government want to criminalize certain fighting words, the Court now
requires it to criminalize all fighting words . . . It is inconsistent to hold that the
government may proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that
speech is evil, but that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently
without violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition
worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection [if the statute prohibits fighting
words, or similarly unprotected speech].
R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 401 (White J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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however, it would hardly demonstrate a speech interest compelling
enough to outweigh that of the challenged legislation.
There is another advantage to a balancing test exemption (to
content-neutrality) as well. It would emphasize that the contentneutrality doctrine, although constitutional and thus prevailing in nature,
must face up to competing legislative interests such as sexual harassment
and Title VII. By virtue of its operation, this hypothetical balancing test
would illustrate that some speech inequality and content-discrimination
can be beneficial to society, particularly that which results from the
countervailing interests embodied in anti-harassment legislation (even if
"official suppression of ideas is afoot" within that legislation).
To illustrate, let us consider the facts of the Jacksonville Shipyards
case which was addressed under heading II.B.1.iii.16 1 In that case, the
federal court of Florida's middle district found that the plaintiff should
prevail in her hostile environment sexual harassment claim. 162 She was
surrounded in her workplace by posters of nude women and women
engaging in sexual acts, and endured comments by male co-workers that
jokingly related those images back to the plaintiff's body and
sexuality. 163 To the extent that some of this speech may be protected by
the First Amendment (apart from the unprotected obscenities), under the
proposed balancing test it would have to compete against the strong
legislative interest of Title VII (i.e. prohibiting sexual stereotyping and
harassment against women).
The pivotal question is which interest outweighs the other in this
balancing test. Is the interest in keeping women free from hostile work
environments greater than the interest in preserving content-neutrality
and the First Amendment free speech rights attributed to non-obscene
photography? A court would have to answer this question, but one could
safely assume that Title VII's hostile environment regulations 164 would
survive this challenge, given the compelling interest which the statute
represents for women.
In sum, by applying a balancing test which gives full consideration
to the content-neutrality doctrine, while at the same time abandoning the
convoluted and impractical R.A. V. exemptions, the Supreme Court may
be better equipped to analyze content-discriminating legislation, such as
Title VII. Asserting that Title VII reaches only conduct, and not speech,

161.
162.
163.
164.

Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1500-03 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
Id. at 1539.
Id. at 1500-03.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (2004).
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is insufficient as a form of analysis and is too simplistic to reflect the
many facets of Title VII's broad scope.
In the alternative, the traditional "strict scrutiny" test could also be
applied to these facts, although the Supreme Court appears to have
rejected the strict scrutiny analysis for content-discriminating statutes.
Nonetheless, if it had been available, "strict scrutiny" could reasonably
have saved Title VII by reason of the O'Brien test for First Amendment
constitutionality. 165 Under the O'Brien test, Title VII's hostile
environment speech restrictions, and their lacking content-neutrality,
could survive First Amendment scrutiny if they (1) furthered an
important or substantial government interest, (2) the government interest
in suppressing sexual harassment was unrelated to stifling free speech;
and (3) the challenged statute's speech restriction was no greater than
166
needed to further its legislative goal.
V. CONCLUSION

In short, many scholars and courts have agreed that, insofar as
hostile environment sexual harassment is concerned, Title VII violates
the content-neutrality principles of R.A. V v. City of St. Paul. Yet,
because R.A. V. does not simultaneously provide a framework which can
save hostile environment law from unconstitutionality, this commentary
presents a balancing test which, hypothetically, could serve that purpose.
Although R.A. V and Black provide a set of exemptions to the
content-neutrality doctrine, only two of those exemptions can prevent
Title VII hostile environment law from violating the First Amendment.
Those are the "special virulence" exemption and the "secondary effects"
exemption. However, both of these exemptions are inadequate because
virtually any statute could satisfy them, regardless of how offensive the
statute was to First Amendment content-neutrality principles. This is a
loophole in the reasoning of R.A. V-Black which begs an alternative
approach. Ideally, this alternative approach would require departing
from the convoluted and tenuous parameters of Justice Scalia's R.A. V.
exemptions. A more simplistic balancing test could replace Scalia's
method and take into account the ills of content-discriminating
legislation, weighing those ills against the virtues of proscribing sexually
harassing speech in a content-selective manner.

165.
166.

United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
Id.
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It would be a shame for Title VII's hostile environment scheme to
become unconstitutional because the Supreme Court failed to provide
adequate safeguards to preserve its integrity. Although one could
propose many different solutions to create a content-neutrality loophole
for hostile environment sexual harassment, the test proposed here serves
this purpose and compensates for the insufficiency of R.A. V and Black.
Eventually, the Supreme Court will have to revisit this issue and its
entire content-neutrality doctrine, given the problematic attributes which
have been exposed in this commentary. Until that time, however, women
who suffer from a gender-motivated hostile work environment can only
keep their fingers crossed.
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